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The concept of the combat glider can be traced to the outcome of World War I. Under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced to reduce its land army to a token 100,000 men and was prohibited from having an air force. Since the treaty did not prohibit the building and flying of gliders, glider-flying clubs sprang up throughout Germany. Within eight years after the war ended, German high schools were offering glider flying as part of their regular curricula. When the Nazis came to power in 1933, the young men trained in gliders helped to form the core of the new German air force, the Luftwaffe.  Hitler himself perfected the strategy of landing assault teams behind enemy lines, both day and night, in engineless aircraft. (Russia pioneered in this area with cargo gliders, though its gliders as troop carriers were never used in combat. However, after the war, Russia maintained three glider-infantry regiments until 1965.)
The German gliders were towed by Junkers 52s, three-engine transports, from an airfield near Cologne. Their pilots circled to an altitude of 8,500 feet, and then flew a 45-mile course paralleling the German front lines. When the objective, 20 miles behind the Belgian border, was easily within reach, the glider pilots released. Twenty minutes after landing on top of Eben Emael, the Germans had sealed the garrison inside the fort at a cost to them of six dead and 20 wounded. Besides the gliders, a key to the success of this daring mission was a top-secret, hollow-charge device which when detonated, imploded. That is, the charge blew inward, not up and out. These 100-pound explosives were placed against the steel-reinforced, concrete cupolas and turrets housing observation posts and large-caliber cannon. The tremendous blasts, each accompanied by a miniature mushroom cloud, instantly neutralized weapons and men, even those directly down in the bowels of the fort, with an inverted, volcanic shower of molten metal and concrete shrapnel.
So how does a combat glider fly ? Four basic forces are at work on a powered aircraft in flight; thrust , drag, lift and gravity. Thrust opposes drag and moves the aircraft forward through the air. It is provided by the engine(s). Drag is the natural resistance of air that opposes an aircraft's forward movement. Lift is the force created by airflow over the wings that oppose gravity, the natural force that pulls the aircraft downward. The same forces are at work on a glider. Thrust is created by the towplane. Drag is air resistance. Lift causes the glider to move forward against gravity. However, once the glider pilot cuts loose from the towplane, the glider was nosed down, with gravity providing the necessary thrust. (In a sailplane, he same forces apply. Even if soaring higher and higher on a thermal or rising air current, the nose of the sailplane must always be pointed down at the proper angle to maintain airspeed - to maintain the proper flow of air over the wings for lift.) ++++++++
At 04.30 hours on May 10, 1940, 82 aircraft began to take off from Ostheim and Butzweilerhof, on the outskirts of Cologne, to initiate what was to be one of the most audacious aerial operations of World War 11; an operation depending for its success on an entirely new weapon of war-the assault glider. Forty-one of the aircraft taking off from the two Cologne airfields were DFS 230A assault gliders, the first of their kind in the history of aerial warfare, the remainder being their Ju 52/3m towplanes. Belonging to the Luftlandegesch wader 1, the Luftwaffe's first "'Airlanding" Geschwader and the first unit of its kind in the world, each DFS 230A carried paratroops whose tasks were the storming of the Eben-Emael fortifications and the capture of the Kanne, Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven bridges which were to be held until the arrival of ground forces. So successful was this operational initiation of the assault glider that virtually every aircraftmanufacturing nation immediately followed Germany's lead and began the design and development of troop and freight -carrying gliders, while the Reichsluftfahrtministerium, which had previously expressed doubts concerning the operational value of Lastensegler (Cargo Gliders), promptly demanded that the highest priority be awarded the development and manufacture of larger aircraft in this category. Designed by Hans Jacobs, the DFS 230, which was developed in the greatest secrecy and began flight tests late in 1937, stemmed from trials conducted in the mid 'thirties by the Deutschen Forschungsinstitut fur Segelflug (DFS) with a large glider intended primarily for high-altitude meteorological research and originally conceived by Rh6n-Rossitten Gesellschaft. During a visit to Griesheim, Ernst Udet watched the flight testing of the glider which was towed into the air behind a Ju 52/3m, and was particularly impressed by its pinpoint landing capabilities. Afterwards Udet remarked to his World War I comrade Oberstleutnant Robert Ritter von Greim that large gliders such as that he had seen at Griesheim. would, if suitably modified, provide a modern equivalent of the Trojan Horse, depositing troops silently and unnoticed behind an enemy's defences. Within a few weeks of this conversation, the DFS had received instructions to design and build a glider capable of accommodating a pilot and nine fully-equip troops. The structural design of the DFS 230 was thoroughly conventional. The wing comprised a single mainspar at approximatgely one-third chord with plywood covering forward and fabricc the long-span ailerons with inset tabs were fabric covered, the wing was braced to the fuselage at quarter-span by light struts. The fabric-covered welded steel-tube fuselage was rectangular section, and built up on a central keel member, boom intended to absorb the impact loads transmitted to the sprung steel skid. Provision was made for either single or duel control, and, in addition to the pilot, accommodation was provided for nine men who were seated on the central boom. As maximum permissible flying weight of 4,630 lb. Some 600 lb. of freight could be carried in addition to the full complement of 8 men. A large loading door provided at the rear of the cabin in the fuselage portside, and loading of bulky items of freight was facilitated by a detach panel beneath the wing in the starboard side of the fuselage. For take-off a two-wheel dolly was provided, this being jettisoned once the glider was airborne, and early trials revealed gliding angle of 1:18 in fully loaded condition. All initial trials were performed with the Ju 52/3m serving as a tug, but as tests progressed various other aircraft were employed in this role, including the He 46, the Hs 126, and the Ju 87B, and some tri were performed with a fully-laden DFS 230 towed by a team five He 72 Kadett training biplanes. From the outset of the DFS 230 development programme Institute collaborated closely with the Gothaer Waggonfa which was to have initial responsibility for the quantity prod tion of the glider, although this was slow to gather tempo in p! due to lingering doubts within the RLM regarding the tacti, value of such aircraft, a vociferous faction declaiming that glider offered nothing not already offered by the appreciably expensive parachute. Three prototypes, the DFS 230 V1, V2 V3 assembled and tested by the Institute, were followed b asm series of GWF-built pre-production DFS 230A-0 glides, deliveries of the production DFS 230A-1 and A-2, the latter h ing dual controls, finally commenced in October 1939, a tota 28 of the gliders having been accepted by the Luftwaffe by t end of the year. During the autumn of 1938, a small glider-borne
comma had been formed with the pre-production DFS 230s and, as
p of 7. Fliegerdi vision, developed assault techniques before
co bining with the existing paratroop cadres in the XI Fliegerko
With the rapid increase in DFS 230 output from the beginni of
1940, the I Gruppe of Luftlandegesch wader 1, was formed, operational
successes in May being followed by the establishme of 11 and III
Gruppen, and the Gothaer Waggonfabrik bei joined in the manufacture
of the DFS 230 by several other c cerns, including Hartwig at
Sonneburg, Erla at Leipzig, and It had been realized that glider operations
were hazardous rapid, diving descent necessary avoid ground fire. The addition of the braking chute accompanied by some structural strengthening
virtually phased out of the programme by the beginning of the year, delivering three in January and one in February, although a further 28 were produced in June. Nevertheless, no fewer than 1,022 DFS 230 gliders were accepted from five assembly lines, 322 of these being manufactured in Czechoslovakia, and from the summer of 1941 the Lastenseglerstaffeln had begun to augment their strength with the larger Go 242. By the beginning of 1942, only the Prague factory was still producing the DFS 230, and this, too, phased the glider out of production in April after the provision of a sturdier landing skid. Provision was o made for the mounting of a single 7.9-mm. MG 15 machine immediately aft of the sideways-hinging cockpit canopy, this ng the dual task of providing a measure of defence while the r was airborne and supplying suppressive fire once the der had landed and while its occupants were leaving their sport and establishing themselves under cover. Some units nted this armament with a pair of MG 34 infantry machine which were attached to the nose of the glider and were ded to provide suppressive fire during the landing approach. For nearly a year after their operational d6but in the offensive st France and the Low Countries the DFS 230-equipped seglerstaffeln were restricted to freight -carrying tasks using riety of tugs, but these reappeared in the assault role on 126, 1941 when they participated in an attempt to capture bridge over the Corinth Canal. This operation was only a ude to the most ambitious airborne assault to be mounted by an forces and in which gliders were to be employed, the sion of Crete. The assault, in which the Luftlandegesch wader again participated, began on May 20, 1941, and no fewer than Ju 52/3m transports with some 80 DFS 230 gliders were oyed to carry 15,750 men to the island. Although this opera was ultimately successful, it was something of a Pyrrhic ctory as it was achieved at the cost of crippling losses by the orne forces. - - Although production of the DFS 230 continued in Czecho ovakia throughout 1941, the Gothaer Waggonfabrik had 105 delivering a further 74 aircraft. The principal DFS 230 Lastenseglerstaffeln were 1. to 10.IDFS 230 Staffeln der Luftwaffe, most of which, together with 1. to 6.lGo 242 Staffeln, were soon incorporated in Schleppgruppen 1, 2 and 3. There were also the two Luftlandegesch wader, LLG I and LLG 2, and a number of semi-autonomous Schleppstaffeln. The DFS 230 saw considerable use in the supply role both in the Mediterranean theatre and on the Eastern Front, its first largescale operation on the latter being the supply of German forces encircled in Kholm between January and May 1942. For this task the DFS 230s were used in concert with Go 242s, and during the final stages of the battle, shortly before the town was relieved, the gliders were having to land in the streets under heavy fire, the losses in both gliders and trained personnel being heavy. The DFS 230s usually employed the Seilschlepp,
or cable-tow, being attached to a 131 ft.-cable, but for night
and bad-weather missions the Starrschlepp (rigid-tow) arrangement
was used. Yet another arrangement that Fritz Stamer and his group
at the DFS began to investigate in 1942 was the so-called Mistelschlepp
in which a powered aircraft was attached to the DFS 230 in a Huckepack
(Pick-a-back) configuration. Preliminary tests were made with
a Klemm KI 35B as the Huckepack component of a DFS 230B-2, the
combination being towed off the ground by a Ju 52/3m, the power
plant of the KI 35B being sufficient to sustain both upper and
lower components in flight once operational altitude had been
attained. A further series of..tests were conducted with the KI
35B replaced by a Fw 56 St6sser, these Various experiments were also conducted to find means of landing the DFS 230 in extremely confined spaces, and a DFS 230B airframe minus wings but with a similar undercarriage to that later utilized for the Huckepack experiments with the Bf 109E-1 was delivered to Focke-Achgelis which fitted a simple rotor pylon carrying the tilting rotor head and 39 ft. 4-1 in. 4 diameter three-bladed rotor of the Fa 223 helicopter. With rotor replacing fixed wing, the DFS 230B was redesignated Fa 225, and was intended as a pinpoint-landing assault rotor-glider, being towed in the normal fashion by Seilschlepp at speeds of 115155 m.p.h. with the rotor free-wheeling. Weighing 4,400 lb. of which disposable load was 2,200 lb., the Fa 225 could land in a space only 15-20 yards in length. However, controllability of the Fa 225, which was designed and built within seven weeks, left something to be desired, and preference was shown for a totally different scheme proposed and developed by the DFS in which braking rockets were fired in sequence during the landing run. The Rheinmetall-Borsig powder rockets were mounted in a special ly-modified nose cone, and the pilot made a fast diving approach to the landing area, deployed his braking chute and, at the moment of touching down fired the first of the three braking rockets, the remaining rockets being fired in rapid sequence. The trio of rockets had a dramatic effect on deceleration, the glider coming to a standstill within 16 yards, and an incidental advantage in their use was the dense cloud of smoke which they generated and which completely hid the glider as it came to a standstill. For the rescue of the deposed Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, from his prison at the peak of the Gran Sasso Massif in the Abruzzi Molise, a small number of DFS 230B-1 gliders were fitted with the nose braking rockets under the designation DFS 230C-1. Accompanied by an Fi 156 Storch in which Mussolini was to be flown to safety, the DFS 230C gliders of the Sturm Abteilung Skorzeny carrying the assault troops led by the redoubtable SS-Hauptsturmfifihrer Otto Skorzeny had to land on a small triangular ledge studded with outcrop rock. This extremely tricky operation was performed with complete success by the rocket-equipped gliders, and the DFS was prompted to design a new nose section which it was proposed to fit retrospectively to existing DFS 230B-1 gliders. The new nose embodying an improved braking rocket installation with a device to fire the rocket automatically in sequence was fitted to the DFS 230 V6, and with this modification the DFS 230B-1 would have become the DFS 230D-1, although it was not, in the event, to be adopted. The losses suffered by the Schleppgruppen and the Lufflandegeschwader during the supply of the Kholm pocket in the early months of 1942 resulted in the decision not to employ gliders to supply the similarly-besieged Stalingrad at the end of the sa!ne year, but the situation had become so precarious by the beginning of 1943 that the three Gruppen of LLG I were sent to Luftflotte 4's sector, although they were not to be used to carry supplies to the Stalingrad garrison, being transferred in January 1943 to the Kerch peninsula to participate in the supply of the Kuban bridgehead. At this time LLG I comprised I/LLG I with DFS 230s and Do 17 towplanes, and 11 and III/LLG I with DFS 230s "and a mixture of He 45s, He 46s and Hs 126s for use as towplanes, plus an attached Gruppe of Go 242s and He I I I towplanes, and a few Me 321s with He I I IZ tugs. During the course of the Kuban operations, from January to October 1943, LLG I's Lastenseglerstaffeln suffered serious losses, particularly during the winter months and periods of bad weather for which they had neither the necessary experience or equipment. A DFS 230-equipped unit that participated in the supply of the 1. Panzer-Armee was the Schleppgruppe 2 which operated with He I I I towplanes from Lemberg. After flying two missions to the I.Panzer-Armee, Schleppgruppe 2 concentrated solely onsupplying forces within encircled Tarnopol. This was surrounded by such concentrated Soviet anti-aircraft artillery that supply missions could only be carried out at dawn and dusk, the DFS, 230s being released at altitudes between 6,500 and 8,200 ft. and making their approach while the Soviet flak positions were subjected to diversionary bombing attacks. Despite the efforts of Schleppgruppe 2, however, Tarnopol fell to Soviet forces on' April 15, 1944. The next such re-supply operation in which the DFS 230 took a part was that of Budapest between December 28, 1944 and February 15, 1945, the- unit concerned being I/LLG 2. Do 17s were employed as towplanes but were of limited use as they were equipped only with the Seilschlepp attachment which was unsuited for night or bad weather operations. One of the last operations of the DFS 230 in World War took place on the night of March 23, 1945 when an attempt wa$, made to land six gliders at Breslau which was under siege4 Unbeknown to the Wehrmacht commander, Gauleiter Hanke hao personally radioed Martin Bormann in the Reichskanzlei with request that heavy artillery be airlifted to Breslau to dislodgi. Soviet forces already established in city blocks.
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DFS 230 Following military interest in a research glider developed by DFS, a contract was awarded for the construction of three prototypes. Demonstrated successfully during 1937, following a preproduction batch of DFS 230A-0s, it was ordered into limited production as the DFS 230A-1 operational version and DFS 230A-2 with dual controls for training. These and subsequent versions totalling more than 1,000 aircraft were built by several factories, becoming the Luftwaffe's standard assault glider. A braced high-wing monoplane of mixed construction, the DFS 230 provided accommodation for a crew of two and eight fully armed troops. Towable by a variety of Luftwaffe aircraft, the DFS 230 used Jettisonable landing gear for take-off, and landing was accomplished on a central skid mounted beneath the fuselage. The DFS 230B-1 and dualcontrol DFS 230B-2 introduced air-deployable brake parachutes to allow the glider to dive steeply if it came under attack. An MG 15 was fitted behind the cockpit for a measure of self-defence and for suppressive fire once the glider was on the ground. Some units field-niodified their gliders with twin MG 34 guns in the nose. The DFS 230 mounted the world's first operation by gliderborne troops when the Belgian fort of Eben Eniael was captured on 10 May 1940. DFS 230s were used also in the invasion of Crete and on many other alrborne operations. Most often, they were used as transports, and in this role they flew their last mission in March 1945.
A more' practical solution was the use of forwardthrusting Rheinmetall-Borsig brake rockets strapped to the nose. These could stop a DFS 230 in just 15 m (50 ft) while producing a cloud of white smoke which disguised the aircraft and its occupants. A force of rocket-equipped gliders, designated DFS 230C-1, was used in the daring rescue of Benito Mussolini from his inountain-top prison. Ali improved rocket nose section was proposed for the production DFS 230D-1, which in the event did not inateriallse. The DFS 230 V7 was an entirely new design which would have been built as the DFS 230F-1. Only one prototype was built. Specification Ill Pp-rformance: maximum gliding speed 290 km/h (180 mph),- normal towing speed 180 km/h (112 mph) Weights: empty 860 kg (1,896 lb); maximum take-off 2100 kg (4,630 lb) Dimensions: span 21.98 m (72 ft I IX in); length 11.24 m (36 ft 10112 in); height 2.74 m (9 ft 0 in); wing area 41.3 M2 (444.56 scl ft) Armament: one 7.9-mm (0.31 -in) MG 15 machine-gun
__________________________________________________________________ President of the Reichstag. Under Hitler the following year G6ring among other appointments was named Reichs Air Commissioner and he enlisted as his principal aide Erhard Milch, the man who had been responsible for the development of Lufthansa, the airline that had also played a secret r6le in testing transport aircraft and providing flying experience for future military pilots. In 1932 now Oberst Kurt Student was reassigned as Director of Air Technical Training Schools. G6ring's new Luftwaffe was born in 1935 with the immediate aim of deploying 1000 aircraft. Student thought that parachutists Would ideally implement Seeckt's concept of lightning wars. Reichswehr generals had witnessed, in 1931, the first publicized drop by armed infantrymen of the Red Army near Voronezh and reported favourably on the idea. Student's job embraced all aspects of military aircraft technology, including equipment, weaponry and parachutes. In September 1936, Student was one of many observers, who in the Minsk area Witnessed a Red Army demonstration drop by no fewer than 1500 infantrymen free-falling from ANT-6 bombers. During the same exercise light trucks, 3-ton trucks, light armouredcars and light guns slung between the wheels of the bombers were parachuted safely to the ground. At this time too the Red Army Was already experimenting with gliders towed both singly an~ in tandem' Britain's General Wavell, Who was also ? resent at the demonstration, was impressed but saw no future in airborne troops; Student on the other hand was tremendouslv excited by the prospect. His strategy was to be basei on the sup'erioritv of air power preached more than ten years previously by N4itchell, Douhet and Trenchard. 6n January 20 f936, Hermann G6ring issued orders for the raising of a parachute battalion based on a parachute training school to be established at Stendal, in North-West Germany. This was the first of the three battalions of Fallschirmj,~ge r- Regiment 1. The first volunteers were recruited from the Hermann G6ring Regiment, formerly the Prussian state police. Bruno Brduer, their Colonel, had been a battalion commander of the Hermann G6ring state policegroup; he became a general during the war and at the end of it Was executed in Athens by a Greek firing squad. In the same year a parachute infantry company was formed from Army volunteers. Its commander was Richard Heidrich, also to be a general and who is best remembered for his leadership of the Fallschirmkorps I in the defence of Monte Cassino, in Italv, in 1943. The school at Stendal was at first commandecf by Major F W Immans, followed in 1937 by Oberst Bassenge. The Germans decided that the rip-cord idea for releasing a parachute canopy and rigging lines that they had seen in operation in Russia was useless for military operations. At this stage technical development of the G~rman parachute was focused on the state-line operated, single-point suspension Salvatore type developed by the Italian Air Force. An operational jumping height of 300 ft (91 m) was considered necessary and even at the training level of twice that height manually operated parachutes could not always be relied on to &velop fully before the parachutist hit the ground. The Rfickenpackung Zwangaul6sung (RZ) 1, as the first German type was called, had a 28-panel, 28-ft (8400 mm) diameter canopy and was far from safe. This model was followed by the RZ 16 and in 1941 by the RZ 20, the standard German parachute for the rest of the war. The RZ 36 also appeared in 1943. A study of photographs of the Fallschirmjdger in flight clearly reveals that the rigging lines descending from the canopy converged on a strop, which was attached to the back of his harness. The jumper had no means as was the case with the more efficient Irvin X-type in British wartime service - and later - of manipulating lift webs, attached to groups of rigging lines to control oscillation. The German paratrooper fell suspended from his back, face and body downwards in a crouching position; a swimming motion with all four limbs explaining his efforts to control his line of flight. The characteristic method of making an exit from the aircraft door was head first in the manner of a diver but with arms and legs outstretched; a risky experience as there was a high incidence of fouling the static line. The Germans, who packed their own parachutes before take-off, wore knee-pads to absorb the shock of a forward roll on reaching the ground. Milch in the meantime had not been idle in building up the Luftwaffe. In 1934, the former Lufthansa director, who had controlled the largest civil air fleet in Europe, projected the production of more than 4000 military aircraft, including primary trainers, over a period of 21 months. The total quantity envisaged included 450 Junkers Ju 52/3M transports, which flew at 150 mph (241 kmph). The Ju 52/3M was then the mainstay of Lufthansa and had enjoyed thousands of hours' successful flying before the first military version (a bomber) was delivered in 1934. The Ju 52, or Auntie Annie or Judula as the German airborne troops called it, was the ideal aircraft for dropping parachutists as well as lifting air-landing troops into battle. In spite of its fame as one of the qeatest transport aircraft of all time the Ju 52 was a rather ugly-looking beast. Its corrugated surfaces and square-cut wings gave the machine an appearance all of its own. The aircraft was nevertheless very strong and could take off from improvised air strips. Freight was loaded through a door on the port side and extra supplies could be carried on bomb racks under the fuselage and wings. Alternatively these external points could be loaded with weapons containers for dropping to parachute troops on the ground. This new breed of the Hugo Junkers long line of all-metal aircraft could be loaded with up to 10,000 lb (4500 kg) of cargo, or 18 troops as passengers, or 13 jumpers. The speed of the Ju 52 reached 182 mph (293 kmph),,N,ith a range of 800 miles (1287 km) in later models. The Ju 52 first gained operational experience with the Legion Kondor in Spain, although it was not used during the Civil War as a paratroop aircraft. But apart from carrying supplies, Junkers transport aircraft did figure with some Italian Savoia- Marchetti transports of the Regia Aeronautica in the first major airlift of reinforcements to the battle zone. The period was July-September 19'6, when 9000 colonial troops of Franco's Army of Africa were transported from Spanish Morocco to Tetuan, in Seville. These airborne reinforcements probably saved the nationalists from defeat right at the inception of the revolt. As the war developed, at least six schools were opened at different times in Germany for parachute training but it was the first at Stendal that was the best known, because of its early associations with airborne warfare. Volunteers were subjected to three months' military training, including the handling of enemy weapons before the 16-day jump course began. Parachuting following the simulated training in Ju 52 fuselages on the ground and tumbling from platforms on to matting then became a reality. Six jumps, including participation in a company descent, were necessary to obtain the parachutist's badge. For parachuting the Ju 52 was stripped of all fitments except canvas seats and a strong point for the static line. On approaching the dropping zone the Absetzer (,despatcher) on a signal from the pilot, shouted the order: 'Make ready' and sounded a horn as a warning to prepare for action. No further orders were now given as the parachute troops clipped their static lines or pull-out cords to a metal cable and sliding their hooks along with them as they shuffled through the fuselage made their exits from the port door. Once into the slip stream the static line broke open the parachute pack and was left trailing from the aircraft. Student first visited Stendal as inspector general of Luftwaffe flying schools. He was then a major-general and on I July 1938 he assumed command of A airborne units. The German paratroopers were Luftwaffe personnel and not infantry soldiers; airborne o-perations 1939-45 were with a few exceptions an air force responsibility. By September, Student had established the main elements of the 7th Air Division, which included a small glider unit and an auxiliary force of Junkers transports assigned to the airlifting n5le. The 16th Infantry Regiment had been flown into the Sudetenland and during the main invasion of Czechoslovakia Student's 7th and 22nd (Air-Landing) Divisions gave a demonstration of air power if nothing else by flying into Freudenthal, in Moravia. One problem facing all airborne forces at their inception over the next few years was that the paratrooper could carry little in the way of weapons and equipment during the descent. The Fallschirmjdger's webbing equipment was worn beneath a gabardine overall but he relied on the weapons containers dropped into action at the same time as the troops for his fire-power and essential supplies. Another method had to be found of supporting parachute troops by flying both men and mat~riel to the scene of battle. The small glider force referred to above had originated from the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt ffir Segelflug who had German para insignia. Left to right: Luftwaffe cloth, Army breast badge, Luftwaffe breast badge
developed a military glider from a sailplane
used for highaltitude * meteorological research. The DFS-230,
as the new glider was known for short, could be used for freight
or accommodating ten men, including two pilots seated in tandem.
The DFS-230s were in full-scale production in 1937 at the Gothaer
vehicle factory but the fuller development of the glider arm of
the Luftwaffe awaited the introduction of the Messerschmitt 321
- Gigant - in 1941 and Gotha 242 in 1942. More about these gliders,
the tow aircraft and their methods and the deployment of German
gliders follows later. Whereas General von Kluge was impressed
by the new parachute element of the Luftwaffe and promisei Student
all the help he needed in developing the airborne method, General
von Brauchitsch, who witnessed a display drop at Munsterlage in
June Y9.39, formed a less favourable opinion of the proposed spearhead
of the German lance. The first time the Luftlandetruppen were
exposed to the public was at the Berlin military parade of the
same -year when Oberst Brduer led a goose-stepping detachment
Nvearing airborne apparel and parachute bags past Hitler's saluting
base. But whereas the pride of the German armed forces were the
Panzers, the airborne warriors clearly had their uses in capturing
key positions behind the enemy, lines. It remained to be seen
however, if it was worth training an expendable corps dAite. Generallentnant
Student - described by Brauchitsch as an optimist' - was nevertheless
ready for war. Three parachute regiments (FJR 1, 2 and 3) with
airborne support units were in existence when Flicgcrdivision
7 in September 1939 moved as ground troops into Poland with a
view to exploiting airlanding opportunities. The campaign was
over before the Fal1schirmidger had a chance to buckle their seat-straps. The Russians, who in 1942 went over to using a parachute with a square-shaped canopy operated by static-line and wore a second rip-cord type as a reserve on the chest, at first used a manually operated copy of the lr,~'in version with a circular canopy. As was noted by the foreign observers who witnessed the large-scale Soviet airborne manoeuvres in 19'5 and 1936, the huge, rather ponderous AN,,TT-6 bombers flew in at about 2000 ft (610 in) and the parachutists clambered in quick succession through hatches in the tops of the fuselages and descend(,(] earthwards by free-fall after rolling off the starboard winP. The dropping height was unrealistic Russian para badges. Left to right: 500 jumps, instructor, basic, 10 and 30 jumps
operationally as wide dispersal of the troops on the ground prev,ented swift assembly. The slow-flying carrier aircraft would be vulnerable moreover to anti-aircraft fire. Even during the war the Russians had no standard method of dropping equipment and supplies and much use was made of improvization. Consideration was actually given, as it was indeed by the British, to drop troops in containers mounted on platforms suspended from clusters of parachutes; a lunatic scheme that hardly merits evaluation! The Russians from early on, however, did succeed in dropping a considerable variety of light ordnance, tanks and transport both with and without parachutes, but again the chances of speedy deployment on the ground were remote. Limited experiments were made with gliders but it was not until 1941 that the Antonov A-7, a straight copy of the German DFS 230, put in an appearance after many prototypes had been rejected. The A-7 was mainly used for supplying partisan groups. Marshal Tuchachevski, the guiding spirit of Russian armoured warfare policy, was also responsible for the swift build-up of the Red Army airborne brigades but did not survive the Stalin purges of 1937--438. In 1939 small groups of parachutists were dropped in action near Summa and Petsanio in Finland and the build-up of airborne forces continued until in mid-1941 the Red Army boasted five Airborne Corps, each consisting of three brigades, a grand total of approxin-iately 50,000 men. This was a formidable establishment but the Russians throughout the war never grasped the potential of parachute troops. The air-lifting of whole divisions, on the other hand, became common practice and was crucial to the successful outcome of a number of major battles. Although Rumania opened a parachute school in 1937 at Pantelimon, near Bucharest, the only other countries apart from Russia, Germanv and Italv to possess organised parachute units before tl~e outbreak of the Second World War were Spain, Poland and France. In 1938 during the Spanish Civil War Luftwaffe instructors trained a small group of Nationalists as parachutists at Barbastro. Similarly a small group of Republicans received instruction from Russian teachers at Las Rosas. Neither unit jumped in action. Although largely unmechanized, the Polish Army in 1939 was powerful; that at least was the opinion of the Polish leaders who - as the Nazi menace mounted on their western borders - talked confidently of a 'cavalry ride to Berlin'. Parachute training had been undertaken since 1936 and the Polish Air Force had suitable transport planes. jumping instructors were trained at Jablonna, near Warsaw; descents being made from towers and balloons. Demonstration jumps from aircraft followed at Wieliszew in 1937 and at Lwow in 1938. A Military Parachute Centre was established at Bydgoszc in May 1939 xNhen the first Army cadre began a
two-month parachute course. A second course was in being when on I September the Germans advanced across the Polish frontier. Some Polish parachutists were among General Sikorski's Army in Exile in France and they later escaped to Britain. In mia-1940, Poles were among the earliest recruits to volunteer for training at the newly-opened Parachute Training School at Manchester's Ringway airport and Polish officers went on to make a distinguished contribution to the development of the RAF's parachute training methods. A parachute school was opened in France at AvignonPujaut in November '1935. A French Air Force mission had visited Russia earlier that year and bad reported favourably on the concept of airborne forces. The French school was an Air Force responsibility and the training methods Russian. Two companies, 601 and 602, of L'Infanterie de FAir were formed. This was in January 1937 though the first parachute wings were not awarded until 12 months later. Both companies were sent to North Africa but recalled to France as soon as war was declared. An operation against the Dutch island of Walcheren was proposed in November 1939 but was never performed and the parachutists were used on the Western Front in a commando/I reconnaissance ground r6le. L'Infanterie de FAir was disbanded on 27 July 1940; the Vichy government's decisioti to break tip the regiment being announced in the words of the para commander with I regrettable indifference'. __________________________________________________________________ parachute, by direct airlift in transports, by glider. The evolution of the aircraft two world wars had seen extensive entation with airborne troops by all powers, which bore fruit between and 1945. first country to use airborne troops World War II was Germany, during campaign in Scandinavia in April 1940. troops concerned were the responsibility Luftwaffe, whose workhorse for this of operations was the time-trusted An antiquated looking, tri-motor the J11 52 served throughout the had a basic crew of two or three and up to 18 troops or some i o,ooo of cargo. Over 3,000 machines of this type were built and used from the c to Africa. i ghder-bome troops hit the eadlines in May ig4o with their assault on Fort Eban-Emael in The standard German troopglider of World War II was the 230, which could carry eight fully soldiers. These gliders were also during the hazardous landing on Crete May 1941, in North Africa, and in er 1943 during the daring rescue by an airborne commandos of Mus iviancnuria-one weex arter Me tirst nuclear bomb had been dropped on Japan. The Japanese also used paratroops, both in the invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942 and three years later, in attempts to reinforce the Philippines against the American invaders. But in the overview by far the most extensive use of airborne troops was made by Britain and the United States in the liberation of Europe, between 1943 and 1945, the first large-scale Allied airborne attack taking place during the assault on Sicily-'Operation Husky'-in July 1943. Sicily was the first bi-national invasion which the Allies attempted, and was shared by the British 8th Army and the American 7th Army. In the British sector the airborne attack was a tragedy. It was made by 134 gliders towed by American-flown Douglas C-47S (the Allied counterpart to Germany's Ju 52). On D-Day, July io, the airborne force (the British ist Airborne Division) had to contend with strong winds made worse by the faulty navigation of their tugs and as a result the gliders were released too far out. Nearly 50 of them came down in the sea. drowning their troops. Most of the other gliders landed way off target and only 12 of them reached the correct landingzone. A total force of only 73 officers and men reached their objective: a key bridge on the Syracuse road. By the time the In the battle for Sicily, and later on in Italy, German airborne troops were encountered. Although after Crete they did not operate in their correct role, these picked men were formidable ground troops, holding on in defensive positions in apparently impossible situations. The battle of Cassino, where a couple of battered German parachute regiments blocked the approaches to Rome against all-comers for over four months, was their finest hour. For the decisive assault on the Normandy coast in June 1944 the British and Americans used airborne forces to secure the west and east flanks of the beach-head: the American ioist and 82nd Divisions for 'Utah' Beach in the West and the British 6th Airborne Division for 'Sword' Beach in the east. Both airborne assaults used united parachute- and ghder-bome troops. The Americans favoured the Waco CG-4A glider with its capacity for 15 fully-laden troops, the British the Airspeed Horsa and GA Hamilcar. The massive Hamilcar, the first Allied glider capable of carrying a light
from an Italian mountain-top hide- Soviet Russia was the first country British 5th Division fought its way through to join hands, with the airborne troops the latter were down to a strength of 19 men.
Nor did the American glider force supporting the 7th Army landing do much better, being scattered widely over south-eastern Sicily. Their main contribution was to add to the demoralisation of the Italian forces on the invasion sector. Apart from everything else, this tragic muddle led to more attention being paid to navigational proficiency training of airborne transport crews 7-ton tank, could also carry two Bren-gun carriers, or two scout cars, or a mobile Bofors gun. Tugs for these gliders ranged from Stirlings and Halifaxes to C-47s and Albermarles. The D-Day airborne landings were perilous. They were made at night and the Allied air forces commander, Leigh-Mallory, had warned Eisenhower that losses of 8o per cent to tugs and gliders might be expected. Scanty AA fire, excellent radar jamming, and evasive tactics did not produce anything like this loss figure but the drops were far from accurate. Only ondsixth of the US ioist Division was in position by the dawn of June 6, the result largely of scatter caused by evasive tactics. Nevertheless, the sluggish German response plus the gallantry and dash of the troops going into action, secured the objectives by the time the seaborne assault force arrived. The next major Allied airborne operation was a brilliant success-but strategically unneccessary. It was the spearhead of the invasion of southern France, originally intended to be synchronised with the Normandy landings, then delayed by the slow pace of the Italian campaign plus the need to concentrate tugs and gliders for the Normandy assault, and finally launched in August 1944 on the insistence of the Americans and Russians. 'Dragoon', as the invasion of southern France was codenamed, was largely a paratroop affair, carried out by 396 aircraft in nine relays and preceded by special pathfinders. It was the most successful Allied airborne operation to date, with 6o per cent of the paratroops landing on or nearby their droppingzones. But it was largely a sledge-hammer to crack a nut, for after the heavy losses suffered in Normandy it was no part of the Wehrmacht's plan to fight for the south of France. - n ominous name The next major Allied airborne drop will always be associated with one of the most ominous names of World War II: Arnhem. The plan was Montgomery's and it v~as thrown up by the stiffening of German resistance as the Allied troops neared Germany. After the collapse in Normandy and the runaway Allied advance across France to the western borders of the Reich, Field-Marshal Model managed against all expectations to re-establish a firm front in the West at the moment when the Allies were running out of steam. To prevent the onset of a battle of attrition
in the West, Montgomery proposed Operation 'Market Garden': the
opening-up by airborne troops of a narrow corridor along which
21st Army Group could burst into the north German plain, with
the vital bridges over the key Dutch waterways captured in advance
by the airborne forces Paratroop and glider forces were to peg
out the corridor by digging in at Eindhoven, Veghel, Uden, Nijmegen,
and finally n-i nnaerheek on the It was a daring and original plan about which Montgomery has always remained unrepentant. Unfortunately not enough attention was paid to stark reality. For a start the problems in the path of the advancing ground forces were underestimated. It was totally unknown that FieldMarshal Model himself-together with General Student, virtuoso of the German airborne arm and the brains behind the capture of Crete in May 1941 -were actually in the Arnhem area, and would not, therefore, have to weigh up confusing reports before deciding on counter-measures. But the most serious failure of Allied Intelligence was the fact that two Waffen-SS Panzer divisions were refitting in the Arnhem sector. So it was that the airborne troops at the very tip of the 'Market Garden' spearhead -British ist Armoured would irrunediately face counter-attacks by crack German armoured units and were, in any case, confined to one single passable road leading to their desperately battling paratroop comrades. Moreover, an accident of -war gave the entire Allied plan to the Germans within hours of the first landings at Arnhem. A body found in a wrecked American glider which came down near Student's command post at Vught was found to be carrying a full set of the operational orders-an instant dispersal of the 'fog of war' of which Model and Student took the fullest advantage. Contrary to certain reports there is no truth in the assertion that the whole Arnhem operation was betrayed to the Germans by certain members of the Dutch underground. Yet another setback for the Arnhem forces was the dispersal of the troops over the dropping and landing zones and the extremely leisurely pace at which they finally moved in to occupy Arnhem, as well as the tardy drop of desperately needed reinforcements in the shape of.the Polish paratroop brigade. The main force failed to take the bridge. They were instantly counter-attacked and forced to dig in way off their original objective. In the end they had to hold on for a murderous week of street fighting before the survivors could be pulled out. Total failure at Arnhem was countered to some extent by the American success at Eindhoven and Nijmegen, but Montgomery's vision of a lightning breakthrough had vanished. All 'Market Garden' did was to push a salient further into the German front which would later become a useful take-off point for the final assault on the Rhine-and teach the Allies once more to have a healthy respect for the speed of German reactions. Even at this late date, it was clear that the war was far from over. No matter how well trained, no airborne troops could hold out against armour with -nothing more hard-hitting than the 2pounder bombs of the PIAT guns. Further delays to the decisive Allied assault on the Rhine-the most formidable natural barrier between the Allies and Berlin-were imposed by the totally unof December 1944. Eisenhower refused to be argued out of his careful, threefold approach to the 'Battle of the Rhine' and the final assault did not go in until the fourth week of March. On March 23, 1945, Montgomery's army group opened up a smashing bombardment by 3,300 guns along a front Of 25 miles. hree firm bridgeheads were pegged out on the east bank of the Rhine by troops crossing in assault boats, and Montgomery threw in two airborne divisions on the 24th which extended his bridge-head to a depth of six miles. The Americans were luckier: they ,already had a bridge, captured intact at Remagen, which enabled them to launch an immediate land exploitation; and by nightfall on April i the Allies had closed an immense ring around the entire area of the Ruhr.
There then followed an exhilarating fortnight of non-stop advance to the line of the Elbe, halted only by the pressures of grand strategy and international politics which stopped the American 9th Army from pushing right on to Berlin itself. This decision meant that the most daring airborne operation of the war was never attempted: a coup de main which would establish the Allies in Berlin itself. This was to be the crowning operation of 'Eclipse', the code name for the final defeat of Germany. It was drawn up by General Gavin, whose US 82nd Airborne Division had taken Nijmegen in the Arnhem campaign, and General Taylor, commander of the US ioist Division. The main targets in Berlin were the airfields: Tempelhof for 82nd Division and Gatow for ioist. Desperate resistance was only to be expected and the assault force was huge: the initial plan called for 3,000 fighters for close escort, 1,500 transport aircraft, over i,ooo gliders, and 20,ooo-odd paratroops-a bigger force than that which had landed in Normandy on the morning of D-Day. Between Paderborn and Berlin itself, 22 objective lines had been marked out for 9th Army's advance on Berlin. By April 15 the Americans were across the ElbeObjective 'Gold'-and were building up a bridge-head before pushing on to 'Silver'. Beyond 'Silver' lay 'Silk', 'Satin', 'Daisy', 'Pansy', 'Jug', and then, finally, 'Goal'the airfields on the outskirts of Berlin. But on April 15, 1945, General Simpson heard to his astonishment and disappointment that he was to go no further than the Elbe. Berlin was to be left to the Russians-and the most sensational airborne attack plan of World War II was returned to the files.
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